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Abstract
This work investigates both theoretically and empirically how the behaviour of nancial analysts
is a¤ected by competition, measured as the strength of coverage of a stock from other analysts.
The interaction among analysts and investors is modelled as a dynamic cheap talk game. The
theoretical model shows that analysts having a conict of interest with investors, report information
truthfully with higher probability if other, neutral, analysts report information on the same
stock. This empirical prediction is tested on data about recommendations on IPOs. The main
result is that analysts working for the lead underwriter of the IPO (insiders) are more optimistic
when there are no other analysts (not working for the lead underwriter, outsiders) covering the
stock. The data also show that insiders do not seem to use the information contained in outsiders
recommendations. Finally, outsiders are not inuenced by recommendations previously issued by
insiders. These results also allow to discriminate between competing hypothesis brought forward to
explain insiders overoptimism. The empirical evidence suggests that insider analysts overoptimism
is induced by incentives rather than by a psychological bias.
Keywords: Competition, Financial Analysts, IPOs, Recommendations.
JEL Classication codes: D40, D82, G24, L15
1 Introduction and Motivation
The recent scandals involving some of the major players on Wall Street cast dark shadows on the
conduct of many nancial analysts. The prestige and glamour surrounding the profession during
Contacts: e.sette@lse.ac.uk. The previous versions of this paper circulated with the title Opportunistic Advice of
Financial Analysts: Theory and Evidence. I would like to thank my supervisors Antoine Faure-Grimaud and Hyun
Shin for their helpful guidance. I also thank Rocco Macchiavello, Andrea Tiseno, Michela Verardo, Fabian Waldinger
and seminar participants at the LSE, FMG, Econometric Society European Meeting held in August 2006 in Vienna, for
their helpful comments. All errors are my own. The views expressed in this paper are my own and do not necessarily
reect those of the Bank of Italy.
1
the 1990s, which has been dubbed the Age of the analysts, has been dissipated. The public debate
focussed on searching for the causes of the excessive optimism shown by analysts when producing their
reports about companies, as well as for appropriate corrective action. The incentive system inuencing
the analysts has been considered a major suspect and was put under close scrutiny by policy makers in
order to restore condence in nancial information. The industry responded by claiming that analysts
overoptimism was not driven by distorted incentives but by psychological biases leading analysts to
have too positive an impression of the stocks they followed1. Another hot issue in the debate is to what
extent market forces help to soften the potential conicts of interest between investors and analysts
and consequently the desirability and the e¤ects of regulatory intervention.
The growing interest in the behaviour of nancial analysts prompted the appearance of many
important papers investigating di¤erent dimensions of the topic. Some papers document bookrunner2
analyst overoptimism. Rajan and Servaes (1997) show that analysts forecasts of IPOs future earnings
are overoptimistic and they are even more so for more underpriced IPOs and over longer time horizons.
Michaely and Womack (1999) show that sell side analysts are systematically more optimistic than
other analysts in their recommendations. Michaely and Womack (2004) review the literature and
discuss the di¤erent theories brought forward to explain overoptimism from analysts a¢ liated with the
bookrunner. In particular they stress two major hypotheses: the rst, which I label the opportunistic
viewmaintains that sell side analyst overoptimism is driven by incentives. The bookrunner prots
by placing shares of the IPO on the market and from trading commissions. Therefore a positive
recommendation boosts both channels. The latter hypothesis, which I label the naive view, suggests
that analysts following the company through the due diligence process become truly convinced of the
superior quality of the rm just like parents see their kids under an especially positive light. Other
papers point attention on the role of reputation and career concerns in inuencing analyst behaviour.
Hong and Kubik (2003) focus on analysts career concerns and discuss the e¤ects of earnings forecast
precision on job separation. They show that controlling for accuracy, analysts that tend to be more
optimistic are more likely to experience favorable job separations. This evidence suggests that career
concerns could be a driver for bookrunner analysts overoptimism. Jackson (2005) using Australian
data, shows that there is a positive relationship between reputation and performance and also that
more accurate analysts acquire a higher reputation. Fang and Yasuda (2005) document, on US data,
that there is a positive relationship between reputation and forecast quality. They also show that
the relative accuracy of more reputable analysts deteriorates during hot market periods when the
gains from opportunistic behaviour are greatest. Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2005) investigate
whether analyst behaviour inuences the likelihood of banks winning underwriting mandates. Their
results suggest that optimistic behaviour does not increase the chances of winning a mandate. However,
1Blanes-i-Vidal (2004) reports that ...we have the employer of analysts, usually investment banks, who have claimed
that analysts report their private beliefs truthfully, although it is possible that some of them may su¤er from honest (i.e.
irrational) optimism about the companies they cover...
2The bookrunner is the lead underwriter of the IPO.
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they do nd that analysts are more optimistic when the fees at stake are larger.
The existing literature provides a starting point for the present work: there is evidence of sell side
analysts overoptimism and there is evidence that reputational concerns are important for analysts.
This work contributes to this debate investigating how the behaviour of nancial analysts is a¤ected
by competition, captured by the strength of analyst coverage of each stock. The paper develops a
theoretical model whose predictions are subjected to empirical test. The model shows that sell side
analysts incentives to be overoptimistic are tempered by competition and reputational concerns. The
model tries to capture the institutional features of the market for nancial information in order to
derive testable predictions. These predictions are then tested on a dataset of recommendations about
IPOs over the period 1995 - 2002. Another important contribution is that the empirical methodology
developed in the paper allows to distinguish between the opportunistic view and the naive view as
explanations for the overoptimism of analysts working for the lead underwriter of the IPO.
The theoretical model formalizes the interaction among analysts and investors as a dynamic cheap
talk game. This is related to the contributions of Sobel (1985), Benabou and Laroque (1992), Morris
(2001). The main step ahead from these papers is that multiple sources of information are introduced
and their inuence studied in detail. The focus on the e¤ects of competition is shared with Horner
(2002). The main di¤erence is that my paper deals with a cheap talk model and the uninformed party
can be servedby multiple informed ones.
From now on, for expositional clarity, analysts working for the lead underwriter of the IPO are
dubbed insiderswhile analysts working for other broker houses are dubbed outsiders.
To summarize, the paper addresses the following questions:
 Are insiders less optimistic when other outsiders issued (or are likely to issue) a recommendation
on the same stock?
 Do insiders inuence recommendations from outsiders? (in other terms: do outsiders appear to
use the information contained in insiders recommendation when issuing their own recommenda-
tions)
 Are insiders more likely to issue an optimistic recommendation if they observed an optimistic
recommendation from an outsider? (in other terms: do insiders appear to use the information
contained in outsiders recommendation when issuing their own recommendations)
The rst question investigates the e¤ects of competition from outsiders on the behaviour of in-
siders. The model investigates the conditions ensuring that competition is benecial for truthtelling
incentives. The data document that insider analysts appear to be less optimistic when they observed a
recommendation from outsiders, or when they expect them to issue a recommendation (these expecta-
tions are function of rm, industry and market characteristics). However, such behaviour is consistent
both with the opportunistic and with the naive view. In fact, if insiders are psychologically biased
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in that they observe too positive a signal about the IPO, but are rational in updating their informa-
tion, they will be less optimistic when observing the non biased signal contained in recommendations
from outsider analysts. The second question investigates whether outsiders appear to update their
information when observing a recommendation from an insider. The third question is crucial in dis-
criminating between the opportunistic and the naive view: if insiders do not seem to be inuenced by
the information provided by outsiders, their overoptimism cannot be attributed to rational Bayesian
updating, providing indirect evidence in favour of the opportunistic view.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 outlines the theoretical model, section 3 discusses the
testable predictions, section 4 outlines the identication strategy, section 5 presents the dataset, section
6 describes the empirical results, section 7 contains robustness checks, section 8 discusses assumptions
and results, section 9 concludes.
2 A Model of Analyst Behaviour
The interaction among analysts and investors is modelled as a dynamic cheap talk game: analysts
privately observe the realization of a random variable that provides information about the quality of
the rm, and send a recommendation to investors. The latter adjust their portfolios possibly using
the information provided by analysts. Insider analysts have a conict of interest: they would like
to report favorable information, so as to induce investors to purchase the stock, even when they
observe a negative signal, because they are incentivized to do so by their employer. Each analyst is
characterized by a type (careerist, not careerist) which is constant over time and across rms, and
a condition (insider, outsider) which is constant over time for a given rm. The type of analysts is
modelled as follows: the careerist type is willing to enjoy the current prot as he cares both about his
future reputation, and about conforming to the interests of the bank he works for. On the contrary,
a non careerist type wishes to report the truth anyway, because of, say, strong moral characteristics
that induce very large costs from behaving opportunistically. Notice that even a small fraction of such
analysts is su¢ cient to generate the results. The market appreciates non careerist analysts because
their incentives are aligned to those of investors.
Players: there are one insider (he), one outsider (he) and one investor (she).
Timing: Agents interact on an innite horizon, repeating the same stage game (evaluation of an
IPO and investment decision).The timing of the stage game is as follows:
1. Analysts receive a signal about the quality of the IPO and report it (issue a recommendation)
immediately as soon as they observe it. Hence, no strategic delay is allowed. The outsider analyst
might not cover the stock, in that case they receive no information and issue no recommendation.
The insider does not know whether an outsider covers the stock. Recommendations are publicly
observed.
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2. The investor adjusts her portfolio each time she observes a recommendation, provided the rec-
ommendation has enough credibility (notice that it is optimal for her to do so as I am assuming
no adjustment costs).
3. Payo¤s are realized and all players observe whether the recommendation was correct. Therefore
reputation of an analyst is public information.
Information Structure: agents can be of two types, careerist and not careerist. The prior
probability of the latter event is : An analysts type is drawn at the very beginning of the game and
is private information. The investor and the other analyst share the same beliefs about an analysts
type. Analysts also privately observe a signal s about the realization of a binary random variable
 = fL;Hg representing the quality of the rm. The precision of the signal depends upon whether
the analyst is an insider: insiders get more informative signals than outsiders. Formally,
Pr( = Y j s = Y; Insider) = a
Pr( = Y j s = Y; Outsider) = b ; Y = L;H; where a > b >
1
2
ensures that insider agents get a more informative signal than outsiders. The signal of the insider is
independent from those of the outsiders. This assumption could be relaxed, but it is to be noticed that
the independent signal case implies the inuence of outsiders on insiders behaviour is the weakest.
If signals are not independent, recommendations of outsiders provide information about what the
insider observed and thus about his type. Assuming independent signals implies that the presence
of other senders only inuences the chances the insider enjoys current prot if he lies. Suppose the
insider reports that he observed s = H: He might have really observed this signal, but might also have
observed s = L and decide to take the benets arising from inducing the investor to choose the action
that increase current payo¤ (buy).
Contracts: monetary transfers contingent on the correctness of the recommendation are not
feasible.
Analyst Strategies: analysts actions in each period are r : S ! R; where r is a mapping from
the set of signals S to the set of recommendations R: Attention is limited to Markovian strategies,
i.e. strategies that depend upon history at time t   1 only. Strategies are probabilities of truthful
reporting qi;jt ; where i denotes an agent type, j denotes the state observed, and t the time period.
Analyst Payo¤s: the payo¤of analysts is comprised of a wage which is increasing in his reputation
and, when he is an insider, of a term which depends upon his ability to induce investors to purchase
shares of the IPO. An outsider can have a payo¤ term that depends upon the probability of getting
future business with the company. Formally, in the case of a careerist insider, current payo¤ is
U() = w(t 1) + g(
) where w is a wage increasing in the reputation of the analyst for being non
careerist (the intuition is that these are the analysts most valued by investors, though not necessarily
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by investment banks3. The assumption is motivated by the fact that analysts are nominated in the
All American League by institutional investors and there is evidence that such analysts earn higher
wages. The term g represents the payo¤ from inducing investors to purchase the stock. 
 represents
the beliefs of the insider about the likelihood the outsider will be issuing a recommendation: The
function U is continuous and maps R into R. Non careerist insiders payo¤ features a cost of lying, so
that U() = w(t 1) + g(
)  M(1   q) and M is so high that they will always nd it optimal to set
q = 1; and are committed types. Careerist outsiders have a payo¤ U() = w(t 1)+ I   where  is the
gain from issuing a favorable report about the company in terms of greater chances of getting future
business with the same company or with others, and I is an indicator function taking the value 1
when outsiders get a short run gain by misreporting information, and 0 otherwise. In the latter case,
as they do not gain anything by misreporting, they will be indi¤erent whether to report information
truthfully or not, and I assume they will report their information at face value. Notice that such
gains are independent on the behaviour of investors because the outsider is not going to gain by how
successful the current IPO turns out to be. The possible gains are in terms of future business with
the company and for that it is su¢ cient that a positive report is issued. Non careerist outsiders have
a moral cost by lying so that they always report the truth. Finally, to ease the analysis, it is assumed
that insiders face the risk of getting a punishment from their company if they are discovered reporting
low prospects after having observed good prospects. The company can go to court and bring veriable
evidence. Such punishment is large enough so that insiders always report the truth if they observe a
good signal (notice that this might not be necessarily the case, in equilibrium, for careerist insiders4).
Therefore it follows that
qNC;Ht = 1
qNC;Lt = 1
qC;Ht = 1
where NC refers to non careerist and C to careerist. Hence, non careerist agents always report truth-
fully, while careerist agents always report truthfully if they observe the rm prospects are good. It
remains to determine qC;Lt ; the probability a careerist analyst reports the truth when he observes the
rm has bad prospects, and this will be determined in equilibrium. To ease notation, from now on,
qC;Lt = qt:
Investor Payo¤: The investor gets a payo¤ of (()) if she makes the right decision (i.e. sell
when Y = L and buy when Y = H) and ( ()) otherwise, where  : R ! R; is continuous and
3Therefore investment banks are forced to link wage to the chances the analyst is non careerist because such analysts
increase the appeal of the bank to investors, even if banks would prefer careerist types. The wage function could also
include a component linked to the chances of internal career (which could then be decreasing in the probability the analyst
is non careerist) without altering the basic insight of the model. However, if the internal career motive becomes too
strong, insiders will have stronger incentives to misreport and in equilibrium their credibility could even be compromised.
4This follows because if in equilibrium careerist types nd it optimal to report optimistically when the state is low
with relatively large probability, they can also have incentives to poolwith non careerist and report a low state more
often than what own information would dictate. This is essentially the political correctnesse¤ect highlighted in Morris
(2001).
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di¤erentiable at least twice. Moreover,  > 0;  < 0 (so as to ensure a unique interior solution),
 > 0; where  is the quantity of shares traded. The investor adjusts her portfolio by varying 
(for example, buying or selling) as a function of the likelihood the messages received are correct. An
insider analyst is credible as long as ta+ (1  t)[a+ (1  a)(1  qt)] > 1
2
: If this is not veried, the
investor ignores the recommendation from the insider. When recommendations are credible, if only
the message of the insider is available, the probability that buy is the true state conditional on a buy
recommendation from the insider is given by
p =
ta+ (1  t)[a+ (1  a)(1  qt)]
ta+ (1  t)[a+ (1  a)(1  qt)] + t(1  a) + (1  )[(1  a) + a(1  qt)] =
ta+ (1  t)[a+ (1  a)(1  qt)]
1 + (1  t)(1  qt)
and the investor sets the optimal  as the solution of the program
Max p() + (1  p)( ))
It is easy to see that  is increasing in p; which in turn increases in q: In fact the rst order condition
yields
@
@
[p(())  (1  p)( ())] = 0
which reduces to
p(())  (1  p)( ()) = 0
and the implicit function theorem yields
d
dp
=   (()) + ( ())
[p(()) + (1  p)( ())]
which is positive as  < 0: Notice that a bad signal will be taken at face value because careerist types
never report a bad signal when observing a good signal as they could be punished by their employer.
Therefore, following a sell report from the insider,  is set independently of ; the probability the
insider is non careerist5: This implies that p = a is constant and  is set optimally independently of
the analyst reputation.
For the moment, to simplify the exposition, it is assumed that I = 0; so that the outsider does
not gain anything by issuing a favorable recommendation, and therefore reports the information he
observes. Notice that in such a case he will not use the informational content of recommendations that
the insider might have issued earlier. Hence, if the investor also observes the message of the outsider,
5Allowing insiders to strategically report a bad signal when observing a good one, an e¤ect similar to Morris (2001),
would imply that the more reputable the insider, the more it hurts him to issue a bad signal as in that case @
@p
< 0:
This is not the case here as a bad report surely means the insider observed a bad report and the probability the signal
is correct is just a:
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the probability that buy is the correct action is represented by:
pb;bo = Pr ob(bu y j bu y; bu y) =
bp
bp+ (1  b)(1  p)
where the notation indicates that a message from the outsider has also been issued, and that the
message was a buy. As pb;bo > p; a buy message from an insider is reinforced by a buy message from
the outsider. On the contrary, a sell message from an outsider reduces the probability the insider
message was true: in fact, the probability that buy is the true state when the investor observes a buy
message from an insider and a sell message from the outsider, becomes
pb;so = Pr ob(bu y j bu y; sell) =
(1  b)p
(1  b)p+ b(1  p)
it is easy to see that pb;so < p; so that now the investor will buy less shares of the company. Notice
that if the probability the insider is non careerist is not large enough to ensure his recommendation
is credible, then the message of the insider will be ignored and the only equilibrium involves babbling
from the insider. On the contrary, when his messages are credible, then even if the message from an
outsider is more credible, the investor will use all information to update her beliefs about the true
quality of the company.
Beliefs: The analysis is still assuming that I = 0 so that outsiders report information truthfully.
Then, there is no updating on the type of the outsider. The market updates the reputation of an
insider analyst for being non careerist according to Bayes rule, so that:
Pr(non careerist j Sell; T rue) = S;+t+1 =
t
t + (1  t)qt
Pr(non careerist j Sell;Wrong) = S; t+1 =
t
t + (1  t)qt
Pr(non careerist j Bu y; T rue) = B;+ = at
at + (1  t)[a+ (1  a)(1  qt)]
Pr(non careerist j Bu y;Wrong) = B;  = (1  a)t
(1  a)t + (1  t)[(1  a) + a(1  qt)]
It is useful to state a preliminary result.
Remark 1 A careerist insider never reports information truthfully with probability 1.
In fact in such a case, S;+t+1 = 
S; 
t+1 = 
B;+
t+1 = 
B; 
t+1 = t: Then, there is no reputational gain from
reporting the truth, and thus lying is always optimal. This, however, contradicts the fact that q = 1:
Equilibrium: the equilibrium concept is Markov Perfect Equilibrium. There always exists an
equilibrium in which the investor discards recommendations, and analysts babble. Instead the focus
here will be on equilibria with information transmission. In such equilibria the investor uses the
information contained in recommendations, as long as analysts have enough credibility.
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The equilibrium is a set of beliefs  about the insider analyst type, probability of truthtelling
0  qt < 1 and an optimal investment strategy  for the investor so that
 2 argmaxE
the insider behaves optimally and beliefs are conrmed in equilibrium and evolve according to Bayes
rule. The payo¤ of the insider from reporting the truth is
VT = E( j s;
)g + [aW (S;+) + (1  a)W (S; )]
while that from lying is
VL = E( j b;
)g + [aW (B; ) + (1  a)W (B;+)]
and the insider decides whether to lie or to randomize6, so that
VT  VL
In both expressions, W (:) is the continuation value. This formulation implies that the payo¤ of the
insider depends upon the e¤ectiveness of his recommendation: if the investor has more trust in the
analyst, then  will be larger and the current gain amplied. The term E( j j;
); where j = s; b;
represents the expected probability that the outsider issues a recommendation on the company, based
upon company observable characteristics, such as industry, size and upon how hot the IPO market
is and upon the general economic conditions which can be captured by a time variable. All these
characteristics are included in 
: The expectation is conditional upon whether the recommendation
issued by the insider was a buy or a sell, and of course E( j b;
) > E( j s;
): The analysis
concentrates on equilibria associated with value functions W non decreasing and continuous in own
reputation 7. It is still to be proved that the equilibrium is unique, that is, there is a unique
value function W; solving the dynamic problem of the insider, and that the equilibrium probability of
truthtelling q; is unique: This task can be accomplished by applying standard recursive techniques.
Proposition 2 The game has a unique equilibrium probability of truthtelling qt.
Proof. It will be proved rstly that there exists a unique q that solves the equation VT   VL = 0 for
every  and W: To this end, dene a function
S(q; ;W ) = VT   VL = E( j s;
)g + [aW (S;+) + (1  a)W (S; )]
 E( j b;
)g   [aW (B; ) + (1  a)W (B;+)]
6Remark 1 shows that q = 1 (implying VT > VL) cannot occur in equilibrium.
7There could be equilibria withW decreasing in : Such equilibria are not very intuitive though, and can be discarded.
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The function S is continuous: this follows by continuity ofW ,  and : The function S is monotonically
decreasing in q: This follows because when q raises, the rst term decreases and the second term
increases as
@S;+
@q
< 0;
@S; 
@q
< 0;
@B; 
@q
> 0;
@B;+
@q
> 0 . Furthermore,
@E( j b;
)
@q
> 0:
as
@
@p
> 0 and the derivative
@p
@q
is
(1  t)(2a  1)
[1 + (1  t)(1  qt)]2 > 0 as a >
1
2 ; while
E( j s;
)
@q
= 0
as a sell recommendation is taken at face value and is independent of q. Hence the term E( j
s;
)g   E( j b;
)g is monotonically decreasing in q: Then, the assumption that only continuation
values W increasing in  are considered ensures monotonicity is veried. Thus the function S attains
its maximum when q = 0 and its minimum when q = 1: There are two cases: if W (1) < [E((0) j
b;
) E((0) j s;
)]g+ [aW ( (1 a)t(1 a)t+(1 t))]; then q = 0 is always optimal8, because in such a case,
by increasing q; the left hand side VT will decrease further and the left hand side VL increase. If, on
the contrary, W (1) > [E((0) j b;
) E((0) j s;
)]g+[aW ( (1 a)t(1 a)t+(1 t)); as S(1) < 0 there exists
a unique q 2 (0; 1) so that S(q) = 0; and VT = VL:
This shows that for each  and continuation value W there exists a unique q that satises VT
 VL: Also notice that given the continuity of S; uniqueness of q(;W ) implies its continuity. The
next step consists in proving that there exists a unique value function W solving the program. To
this end it will be proved that the function TW () = maxfVT ();VL()g is a contraction, so that by
invoking Blackwell Theorem it is possible to prove that the value function is unique. In equilibrium,
either q = 0 and then VT < VL; so that maxfVT ;VLg = VL; or q 2 (0; 1) and VT = VL; so
that maxfVT ;VLg = VT = VL = V Hence TW () = VL1q=0 + V 1q2(0;1): The function TW () is
continuous by continuity of q;  andW: To prove monotonicity, note that when q 2 (0; 1); the identity
VT = VL = V holds. Consider the couple (1;W1)  (2;W2): Then, if the associated q are such
that 0 < q1 < q2; one can exploit the fact that V = VT to show that V (1;W1) > V (2;W2): On the
contrary, if q1 > q2 > 0; the fact that V = VL allows to prove that V (1;W1) > V (2;W2): Finally,
when q1 = q2 = 0; V = VL; and again it is easy to see that V (1;W1) > V (2;W2): Thus the value
function V = maxfVT ; VLg is monotonic. Discounting is satised as well, so that it is possible to
invoke Blackwell Theorem to conclude that TW is a contraction and admits a unique xed point W:
This, together with uniqueness of q satisfying VT  VL; proves the equilibrium is unique.
The next step is to investigate what happens if I = 1 so that careerist outsiders might want to
mislead the investor in order to please the rm going public and raise the chances of getting future
business. In such a case, a sell recommendation is taken at face value, while the probability a buy
recommendation from an outsider is correct is given by r =
tb+ (1  t)[b+ (1  b)(1  zt)]
1 + (1  t)(1  zt) where
zt is the probability a careerist outsider reports information truthfully. This expression is analogous to
that for careerist insiders taking into account that the signal of the outsider is correct with probability
b: When the investor observes a recommendation from the outsider after that of an insider she will
8Note that in this case, +;S =  ;S = 1
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update her beliefs in the obvious way and
epb;bo = Pr ob(bu y j bu y; bu y) = rprp+ (1  r)(1  p)
and epb;so = Pr ob(bu y j bu y; sell) = (1  b)p(1  b)p+ b(1  p)
where the latter expression follows because sell messages are taken at face value. In such a case the
chances the message from the outsider is correct is given by b. The Markov Perfect Equilibrium will
now be a set of beliefs  about the insider and the outsider type, probability of truthtelling for careerist
insiders qt and for careerist outsiders zt; an optimal action  for the investor so that
 2 argmaxEU
and the careerist insider and careerist outsider optimally decide whether to randomise of lie. The
proof for the existence of a unique equilibrium probability of truthtelling for the careerist insider and
outsider is analogous to the previous case when the careerist outsider has no incentive to misreport,
and is thus omitted.
Now, it is possible to analyse the e¤ects of competition on truthtelling incentives. It will be rstly
discussed the simpler case when I = 0 and the outsider just reports his signal. The answer can be
found by inspecting E( j b;
): As  is increasing in the probability p that the buy message is correct
given the available information, it is su¢ cient to focus on the latter probability. Hence the insider
knows that  is larger, the larger p: Thus he picks his optimal policy as a function of E(p j b;
):
The latter is equal to fa[(1   b)pb;bo + bpb;so ] + (1   a)[bpb;bo + (1   b)pb;so )]g + (1   )p where (
) is
the probability the outsider issues a recommendation on the company and it depends upon the vector

 dened above. This follows because upon observing a low signal, the insider knows the outsider
correctly observes a low signal with probability ab; thus issuing a sell recommendation, and inducing
investor beliefs pb;so that the company has good prospects. With probability a(1   b) the outsider
observes a good report, thus recommending to buy, so that investor beliefs become pb;bo . The intuition
for the rest of the expression should now be obvious.
The next proposition examines the e¤ects of competition on the expected trading volume of the
investor.
Proposition 3 The higher the chances the outsider issues a recommendation, the lower the expected
 if the insider reports a buy recommendation. If the insider issues a sell recommendation, his expec-
tations of  do not depend on the chances an outsider issues a recommendation.
Proof. The expected probability the buy message is correct if the outsider might issue a recom-
mendation is given by: [(a + b   2ab)pb;bo + (2ab + 1   a   b)pb;so ] + (1   )p: The derivative of this
expression with respect to  is pb;so   p+ (a+ b  2ab)(pb;bo   pb;so ): The derivative is negative as long
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as b >
1
2
which is veried as the signal of the outsider is informative. Hence the more likely the
outsider issues a recommendation, the less strongly the insider will be able to inuence the investor
with a buy message. A di¤erent reasoning applies if the insider reports a sell message. In such a case
the expected probability buy is the right thing to do after the insider issued a sell recommendation is
[(a+ b  2ab)ps;bo +(2ab+1 a  b)ps;so ]+ (1 )(1 a): It is easy to see that now the derivative with
respect to  is nil. This follows because the sell recommendation is taken at face value and considered
as correct with probability a:
The intuition for this result is that in the case of a buy recommendation after observing a poor
signal on the company, the insider knows the outsider is more likely to have observed a poor signal (even
if signals are independent, they are not conditionally independent) and thus more likely to recommend
to sell. Therefore, the larger the chances the outsider issues a recommendation, the larger the chances
he issues a sell recommendation, inducing the investor to buy less shares of the IPO. This follows
because p 6= a. On the contrary, if the insider issues a sell recommendation, then his expectation,
today, of what the outsider reports, is just his signal. Therefore the degree of competition has no
e¤ect. The asymmetry between the buy and the sell recommendation comes from the fact that if
the insider reports buy when observing sell, he attributes a larger probability to the event that the
outsider observed poor prospects for the company. Therefore, it is more likely that he issues a sell
recommendation, and this lowers the expectations about investor trading volume of the IPO.
Proposition 4 Competition unambiguously improves truthtelling incentives.
Proof. Competition is parameterized by the probability  that the outsider issues a recommendation.
A greater  reduces E( j b;
) but has no e¤ect on E( j s;
): In equilibrium it is true that
E( j s;
)g + [aW (S;+) + (1  a)W (S; )] = E( j b;
)g + [aW (B; ) + (1  a)W (B;+)]g
or
[E( j b;
) E( j s;
)]g = [aW (S;+)+ (1  a)W (S; )]  [aW (B; )+ (1  a)W (B;+)]g  eVins
Hence, if the chances the outsider issues a recommendation raise, the left hand side is reduced. In
equilibrium the right hand side has to go down in order to keep the insider indi¤erent between reporting
the truth and lying. This implies that q has to raise because [aW (S;+) + (1  a)W (S; )] decrease
in q; and [aW (B; ) + (1  a)W (B;+)] increase.
The intuition is that the presence of outsiders reduces the current gains by misreporting.
Notice that at rst thought, the presence of outsiders could also a¤ect share holdings after the
insider reported a sell recommendation. That could reduce his current gains when reporting truthfully
so much as to reduce truthtelling incentives. This intuition, however, is incorrect, because when the
insider reports a sell recommendation, his expectation of the nal beliefs of the investor are just his
12
information as beliefs follow a martingale.
The model predicts that competition induces careerist insiders to report information truthfully
more often, as the more competitive the market for nancial information is, the larger the chances
the outsider issues a recommendation. The result is derived under the assumption that outsiders do
not derive any benet by misreporting their information and thus act non strategically. If this is true,
the outsider should not be inuenced by the information contained in recommendations issued by
insiders9. This is a further testable prediction of the model.
If careerist outsiders gain by issuing a favorable recommendation (in this case I = 1), the e¤ects
of competition might be less clear. Now, if a careerist insider reports a buy signal, that might reduce
the reputational cost for the careerist outsider to report a buy signal when observing low prospects
for the company. This follows because if the insider recommendations have some credibility, a buy
recommendation induces the outsider to update her beliefs about the true quality of the company.
Proposition 5 A careerist outsider observing a sell recommendation from an insider is more willing
to misreport his information
Proof. The recommendation from the insider cannot make it less likely that a buy message is correct
and thus reduces the reputational cost of a lie. In fact, notice that either the message of the insider
has no credibility, and then has no e¤ect, or it has some. In the latter case, if the outsider observed
a low state his beliefs the true state is good are given by
p(1  b)
p(1  b) + (1  p)b : Hence, the continuation
value by lying is now given by
p(1  b)
p(1  b) + (1  p)bW (
B;+
t+1 ) + (1 
p(1  b)
p(1  b) + (1  p)b)W (
B; 
t+1 ): The
continuation value by reporting truthfully, is W (st+1): It is evident that a buy report from an insider
lowers the reputational cost for a careerist outsider. This follows essentially by standard Bayesian
updating. Notice that the current gains for a careerist outsider are represented by the probability of
future business with the company going public, and thus are not dependent upon the e¤ectiveness of
the recommendation. This implies that they are not dependent on the degree of competition either.
Hence, a careerist insider might take into account the fact that the careerist outsider would be
inuenced by his report. In such a case competition could be harmful for truthtelling incentives. In
order to establish whether that happens, it is useful to dene the beliefs the careerist insider has about
the probability that a careerist outsider will issue a buy recommendation in equilibrium. The latter is
dened as !(zt) where the dependence on zt; the equilibrium probability of truthtelling of a careerist
outsider, indicates that what matters is the likelihood a careerist outsider issues a recommendation
and that he behaves opportunistically. This probability should be part of the vector 
; but with
9Notice that this is not dependent upon the assumption that the signal of insider and that of outsider are independent.
This follows because outsiders have no special interest in reporting truthfully as this provides no signal about their types.
Outsiders just pool because careerist are indi¤erent between reporting the truth or lying and they will then prefer to
pool. In such a case a wrong report will have no consequences on their reputation and this implies there is no interest
in the informational content of insidersrecommendations.
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some abuse of notation I write E( j j;
; !(zt)) where j = b; s; to stress that the expected gains
from inducing the investor to purchase the stock also depend on the likelihood a careerist outsider
issue a recommendation and lie. Notice that when the investor observes a recommendation, she knows
the identity of the analyst issuing it and so can assess his reputation and weigh the credibility of
the recommendation. Also notice that if the investor receives recommendations from a non credible
outsider, and the insider fully anticipates this, then competition would have no e¤ect on the behaviour
of a careerist insider. The next proposition shows that in equilibrium the higher the chances the
outsider issues a recommendation, the stronger truthtelling incentives.
Proposition 6 Competition cannot reduce truthtelling incentives, even if outsiders are strategic.
Proof. When outsiders are strategic a buy report from the insider raises the chances the outsider
reports buy. The insider expectation (after reporting buy) of the probability the investor attaches to
the IPO being good is:
(1  t)fa[b(ztepb;so + (1  zt)epb;bo ) + (1  b)epb;bo ] + (1  a)[bepb;bo + (1  b)(ztepb;so + (1  zt)epb;bo )]g
+ ft[a(bepb;so + (1  b)epb;bo ) + (1  a)(bepb;bo + (1  b)epb;so )]g  !(zt)
Therefore, if !(zt) > p; the insider will have stronger incentives to lie when he expects there is more
competition. The reason is that he expects the competing analyst shares the same incentives he has.
The expression can be simplied, yielding
[ zt(1  t)  t](1  a  b+ 2ab)(epb;bo   epb;so ) + epb;bo   p > 0 (1)
However, if the outsider is credible (implying tb + (1   t)[b + (1   b)(1   zt)] > 12) the inequality
cannot be satised. To see this, notice that the inequality is not satised either when zt = 0 or when
zt = 1: Also, notice that the left hand side of the inequality is monotonically decreasing in zt: Thus,
competition cannot decrease truthtelling.
Thus, the model suggests that competition cannot reduce truthtelling incentives, independently
on whether the outsider is strategic or not. The intuition for this result is that if the outsider is
credible, then he is more likely to report information truthfully. Thus, in equilibrium, if the insider
reported falsely a buy recommendation, he still expects the outsider is more likely to issue a sell
recommendation. The only possibility is that the insider holds di¤erent beliefs from the investor
about the type of the outsider (but this cannot happen in a Markov Perfect Equilibrium unless there
is asymmetric information about the outsider type, or investors are not fully rational). Whether the
latter happens, is in essence an empirical question.
It should also be borne in mind that a necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition for competition to
be harmful for truthtelling incentives, is that outsiders are responsive to the insider recommendation.
In particular, if the insider issues a buy recommendation, that should raise the chances the outsider
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issues a buy recommendation as well. This possibility will be investigated in the empirical section.
Until now it was assumed that the insider moves rst. Removing this assumption does not harm
the results. In fact, if both types of outsider have no incentive to misreport, then the model will be
the same. If careerist outsiders had incentives to misreport, then they would decide their optimal
action on the basis of the expectation the insider is careerist. A careerist outsider will have incentives
to wait for the recommendation of the insider. On the other hand he might pool with non careerist
and issue a recommendation before the insider to show the market he just cares about reporting his
information. This is an interesting problem that, however, does not seem to alter the main mechanism
highlighted in this paper.
The model would also yield predictions about the e¤ect of reputation on incentives. For example, it
is easy to see that as more information about an analyst type has been revealed, truthtelling incentives
decrease. These aspects have not been emphasized in the discussion as the dataset does not allow to
derive information about an analyst reputation.
Finally, an important assumption is that insiders have rational expectations about the likeli-
hood outsiders issue recommendations. Therefore their behaviour reects their correct forecast of
the chances that some outsider will issue a recommendation on any given stock. However, insiders can
make mistakes in assessing whether outsiders will issue a recommendation on the same stock.
In order to clarify the modelling strategy, the role of the main assumptions is summarized below:
 The greater precision of insider signals is introduced for the sake of realism, but plays no specic
role for the results and could be dispensed with.
 The assumption that insiders do not issue a bad report when observing a good signal, determines
the fact that the investor decision is not responsive to reputation when observing an unfavourable
report because the signal is fully credible. The assumption considerably simplies the analysis
and its removal would modify the equilibrium of the game. However, the e¤ects of competition
highlighted in the model will still hold.
 The assumption about the timing of the game is needed to simplify the analysis. Without this
assumption each analyst would choose optimally the timing to issue a recommendation. However,
assuming this does not happen does not seem unrealistic as the data do not show any specic
pattern. Furthermore, insider analysts cannot issue a recommendation earlier than 25 days from
the IPO (40 days, since July 2002), so they have a relatively limited choice. Even allowing
for strategic timing of information transmission, the basic insight about the role of competition
would remain valid.
 The assumption that analysts always issue a recommendation when they receive information
about a company is made to simplify the solution of the model. Allowing for strategic silence
would not alter the basic insight of the model, it would add a further strategic choice to careerist
insiders. This assumption, however, might have consequences for the empirical work: if analysts
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strategically choose to avoid sending a recommendation, the sample might be biased. This
possibility is discussed further in section 7.
 The model assumes that recommendations take a binary form. In practice, however, recommen-
dations can be considered as partitions over the space of company states. The dataset used in
the empirical analysis codies recommendations in 5 intervals. The assumption of binary recom-
mendation allows to improve the tractability of the analysis, without a great loss of generality.
 The model assumes there is one outsider only. This is not restrictive at all. It just helps reducing
the computational and notational burden. In a more general set up, the insider and the outsiders
will form beliefs about the likelihood other outsiders issue a recommendation, and how many of
them are likely to do so. Hence the predictions of the model are suitable to be tested on data
where more than one outsider issues a recommendation.
 The presence of only one insider is slightly more restrictive. The presence of multiple insiders
complicates the analysis, but not the conclusion: in fact, insiders will now form beliefs about
the chances other insiders issue a recommendation, but the intuition of the model will not be
overturned.
 Career concerns in this model are not related to talent, but to some moral characteristics. A
talent model, in which more talented analysts observe a more precise signal of the state of the
world, can yield similar predictions. An important di¤erence, however, will be in the behaviour
of outsiders: the latter would always use the information contained in previous recommendations
of insiders (as long as these are credible) because they will try to guess the true value of the rm
using all available information.
A last point to notice is that in this model the degree of competition in future interactions with
investors is unknown. Analysts do not know which IPO they will follow in the future, therefore a
higher degree of competition on the current IPO does not increase the expected degree of competition
in future IPOs (future stage games). Therefore competition has no e¤ect on the value of future
reputation. On the contrary, if a larger degree of competition on the current IPO implied a larger
degree of competition in the future, then the value of building a reputation might decrease. Sette
(2005) elaborates on this point in the context of organisational design.
3 Testable Hypothesis
The model predicts that competition is benecial for truthtelling (insiders are less overoptimistic when
some outsider issued a recommendation, or when they expect outsiders to do so).
Notice rstly, that insiders often do not know whether outsiders will issue a recommendation. They
form expectations based upon variables such as the size of the IPO, the industry the rm operates
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in, how hot the market is. However, the fact insiders can make mistakes raises the di¢ culty to
identify the e¤ect of competition, because insiders might report the truth attaching a large probability
outsiders issue a (truthful) recommendation, while this might not happen in the data.
Also, the model assumes that analysts are rational and driven by incentives. This is the view taken
by the New York attorney - general, Eliot Spitzer, as well as by a large part of the press about the
nancial scandals of 2002-2003. An alternative hypothesis suggests that analysts are truly convinced
of the superior quality of the stocks they follow, so that they receive an optimistically biased signal but
do not realize it. Then there can be two possibilities: the rst is that analysts are totally naive and
ignore information that could be conveyed by recommendations issued by outsiders. In such a case,
insider analysts should be more optimistic independently of whether they are the rst analyst to issue
a recommendation. The second possibility is that analysts, though optimistically biased, are rational
in updating their beliefs. Then, if they are the rst to issue a recommendation, they report the biased
signal at face value. On the contrary, when an outsider issues a recommendation they update their
signal and make a less optimistic, though positively biased, recommendation. Then the naive view
predicts the same empirical behaviour as the opportunistic view.
However, it is possible to distinguish between these hypotheses by testing whether insider analyst
behaviour is a¤ected by that of outsiders: if the insider is not more likely to issue an optimistic
recommendation after observing an optimistic recommendation from outsiders, then there would be
little evidence in favour of information updating taking place. Then, the opportunistic view would be
consistent with the evidence, while the naive view would not.
To sum up, the following hypotheses will be brought to empirical test:
 H1: Insiders are less optimistic when it is more likely that there are outsiders issuing a recom-
mendation about the stock, so that insiders face more competition.
If hypothesis H1 is correct, it might also be true that
 H2: Outsiders do not seem to react to the information contained in recommendations previously
issued by insiders.
Then, in order to understand whether the behaviour of insiders is consistent with the opportunistic
viewrather than with the naive view, it should be true that
 H3: The extent to which insiders issue an optimistic recommendation is not inuenced by the
observation of previous optimistic recommendations by outsiders.
The next section discusses the identication strategy where these aspects are developed and made
operational, so as to dene how to estimate the di¤erent hypotheses on the data.
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4 Identication Strategy
The identication strategy involves three steps. The rst two steps are necessary to identify whether
insider analysts behave di¤erently when they issue a recommendation facing less competition. The
third step is needed to shed light on the determinants of this behaviour distinguishing between the
opportunistic viewand the naive view.
The rst step is to dene which agents have a stronger conict of interest with investors. In order to
achieve this goal, only IPO deals are included in the analysis. Limiting attention to recommendations
about IPOs issued in the rst days after the company went public allows to dene clearly who is the
insider. The main identifying assumption is that an insider will behave di¤erently if he is the only
analyst issuing a recommendation than if there are outsiders issuing a recommendation on the stock.
Such a di¤erential behaviour could be caused by the mechanism suggested by the theoretical model.
A crucial condition is that once the appropriate controls are included in the regression, the fact that
an insider is alone is not correlated with the intrinsic unobservable quality of the company. If this is
not the case, results would be biased and inconsistent. In fact, this identication strategy relies upon
an important assumption: rm quality is assumed to have the same distribution once industry and
time periods are controlled for, so that the fact that insiders are alone, thus facing less competition
when they issue a recommendation, is independent of rm quality once a proxy for rm quality is
included in the regression. This is not unreasonable, as rm specic quality depends mostly upon
entrepreneurial quality once industry, business cycle e¤ects and returns on the stock are controlled
for. This point is further discussed in section 7. Finally, it is assumed that insiders have rational
expectations on the likelihood outsiders issue a recommendation on each stock. This is important
to ensure that mistakes in the recommendation due to a wrong assessment of rm characteristics
are not correlated with the same rm characteristics included to control for the expected probability
outsiders issue a recommendation.
The second step is to dene the relevant event window: it is crucial to understand when a rec-
ommendation is issued by the insider with outsiders also covering the stock. Two approaches are
employed in the analysis. The rst considers a recommendation from the insider as being issued
alone if either no other recommendation about the stock is issued, or if the insider is the rst to
issue a recommendation about the stock. This provides a clear way to identify whether the informa-
tion provided by the insider can be contrasted with that provided by outsider analysts. The second
approach states that an insider is issuing a recommendation alonewhen no other recommendation
is being issued in the two previous days. Time windows of di¤erent width (up to four days) are used
as robustness checks. A wider event window has the drawback that other informationally relevant
events might be happening. I will also use other measures of competition: I will present regressions
including the number of outsiders issuing a recommendation on the IPO as an alternative control for
competitive pressure.
The third step is needed to establish whether an analyst updates his beliefs after observing a
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recommendation from other analysts (this could be due to rational Bayesian updating or to herd
behaviour). This is crucial in order to understand whether the behaviour of insiders is driven by
incentives or not. This task is accomplished by testing directly whether insiders seem to use the
information contained in recommendations from outsiders (and vice versa). This is done by running a
Probit regression to check whether the fact that outsiders issued a positive recommendation before the
insider, raises the chances the latter issues a positive recommendation. A rejection of this hypothesis
suggests insiders are optimistic independently of whether they observed an optimistic recommendation
from outsiders. Of course, if the hypothesis is not rejected that could also be due to the intrinsic quality
of the rm and the fact that signals are conditionally correlated.
5 Description of Data
Information about IPO deals is provided by Thomson One Banker. The dataset lists IPOs on the US
market from 1995 to 2004 providing data about the identity of the bookrunner, the date of the IPO,
the size of the issue, the o¤er price, the industry, the nationality of the company. There are 3886 IPOs
in the dataset10. Data on analysts recommendations come from I/B/E/S. Recommendations are coded
in a scale from 1 (the most favorable to the company, the IPO is very good) to 5 (the least favorable
to the company, The IPO is very bad). The database also provides information about the analyst
issuing the recommendation, the date of the recommendation, the broker the analyst is working for.
The two dataset are matched in order to identify who is the analyst issuing the recommendation and
whether this analyst is working for the bookrunner and is thus an insider, or not. The companies
receiving at least one recommendation are 3081. The overall sample contains 80000 recommendations
over the whole time span 1995 - 2004. I also include information on returns. These come from the
CRSP database.
The main data issue is dealing with IPOs with more than one bookrunner. In such cases the
game changes: one insider knows that there are chances that other insiders as well as outsiders issue
a recommendation and this can modify his incentives. The strategy is to exclude the company when
multiple insiders are issuing a recommendation in the same time window. The fact that brokers
engaged in extensive M&A activities is not an important problem for this work as the analysis is
limited to the recommendations issued in the rst days after the IPO.
Insiders are prevented to release recommendations about the company before the end of the quiet
period. Then, I consider all recommendations issued 20 days earlier and 20 days later than the end
of the quiet period. This was set at 25 days until July 2002, and later extended to 40 days. For this
reason, data on IPOs issued after the rst quarter of 2002 have been excluded from the analysis11.
10This is consistent with the information provided by Jay Ritter on the number of IPOs per year in the US.
11These could be included adding other 20 days after the quiet period. Results are unchanged. However, recommen-
dation issued 60 days after the IPO date might incorporate a great deal of new information and the comparison with the
period when the quiet period ended on the 25th day after the IPO might be debatable.
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Therefore the sample includes recommendations issued 5 days after the IPO (end of the quiet period
minus 20 days) and before 45 days after the IPO (end of the quiet period plus 20 days). This choice
is motivated by the desire to have a clear denition of competition, and by the desire to minimize
distortions coming from the possibility that new information about the company becomes public in the
meanwhile. A longer interval would add noise as it is more likely that new information gets revealed
in the meanwhile. A shorter interval reduces the sample numerosity and makes inference di¢ cult.
Results are anyway robust to the choice of the length of the time interval around the end of the quiet
period. Finally, I focus on US rms. This is because the "market" for news on international companies
might be di¤erent. Anyway, results are not a¤ected by the inclusion of non-US rms.
5.1 Descriptive Statistics
When the sample is restricted to recommendations issued not later than 45 days and not earlier than 5
days from the IPO for the time span 1995 - rst quarter of 2002 (inclusive), the total number of observed
recommendations drops to 4823, about 1987 rms, by 1601 analysts. When recommendations about
rms having more than one bookrunner are excluded, the sample has 4556 recommendations about
1929 rms, by 1549 analysts. For some observations the analyst identity is not reported, though the
bookrunner identity is. This occurs for 370 recommendations. When this happens, recommendations
are excluded in order to be able to use information about analysts, both employing panel estimation
and to adjust standard errors allowing for clustering at the analyst level. After this step, the sample
features 4208 observations about 1884 rms by 1549 analysts. There are a few cases (34 observations)
where an insider issues more than one recommendation in the 45 days sample. Sometimes this is
due to a mistake in records (the same recommendation is recorded twice), in other cases it is a
di¤erent recommendation issued a few days later. Typically this is more optimistic than the rst
and follows a more optimistic recommendation from an outsider. This is an interesting issue and it
would deserve closer scrutiny as in 18 cases the second recommendation is more optimistic than the
rst, independently of the recommendations issued by outsiders, in 11 cases it is unchanged, even if
outsiders report less optimistically in the meanwhile, and only in 4 cases (out of 34) the insider issues
a worse recommendation. Unfortunately the limited number of observations available does not allow
to provide hard evidence about this behaviour. These observations are excluded from the analysis,
but the estimation has been performed also on the sample including such observations as a further
robustness check and results hold.
The database also contains information on the type of shares issued. There are 15 di¤erent types
of issues, as listed in Table I.
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Table I
Type of shares issued Freq Percent Cum Type of shares issued Freq Percent Cum
Class A Shares 138 6.48 6.48 ADR 1 0.05 7.70
Class B Shares 8 0.38 6.85 ADS 32 1.50 9.20
Global Dep Shares 1 0.05 6.90 Common Shares 1,892 88.83 98.03
Income Dep Securities 2 0.09 7.00 Non-Voting Class B 1 0.05 98.08
Series B-1 1 0.05 7.04 Ord/Common Shares 11 0.52 98.59
Sub Voting Sharess 1 0.05 7.09 Ordinary Shares 24 1.13 99.72
Limited Partnership Int. 11 0.52 7.61 Benecial Interest 6 0.28 100.00
Trust Units 1 0.05 7.65
I am including in the analysis, ordinary (or common) shares, only. Comparing di¤erent nancial
instruments can be misleading as the degree of competition among analysts could di¤er for very
specialized nancial instruments. Also including issues of shares with limited (or extra) voting rights
could a¤ect the recommendation. Therefore the sample is limited to the IPOs classied as Common
shares, Ord/Common Shs, Ordinary Shares. In this case the dataset includes 3790 recommen-
dation from 1428 analysts on 1717 rms. When I include information on returns, the sample size is
marginally decreased. If returns in the three months following the IPO are included, then there are
3692 recommendations from 1390 analysts about 1649 IPOs and when returns are computed in the
six months following the IPO, then there are 3660 recommendations from 1388 analysts about 1635
IPOs. The last renement of the dataset concerns the exclusion of non-US rms12. Then, the analysis
is performed on a sample made by 3614 recommendations from 1361 analysts about 1623 IPOs.
It is important to review the summary statistics of the sample.
The average recommendation is summarized in Table II-A.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All analysts excluding recommendations by multiple insiders 1.566 0.5709 1 5
Insiders 1.521 0.5460 1 3
Insider only when the insider is the rst 1.451 0.5400 1 3
Insider only when no outsider issues a recommendation 1.370 0.5010 1 3
Insider only within two days time window 1.460 0.5427 1 3
A preliminary inspection of Table II-A suggests that insiders issue more optimistic recommenda-
tions than outsiders, and furthermore that insiders seem to be more optimistic when they face less
competition.
12The inclusion of non-US rms does not a¤ect the results.
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Table II-B summarizes the distribution of recommendations.
Recc All Insiders Outsiders
1 47.22 50.23 45.66
2 49 47.35 49.86
3 3.70 2.42 4.36
4 0.05   0.08
5 0.03   0.04
About 50 percent of recommendations take the most positive value, 1; while the other half has a
predominance of 2: Hence recommendations could also be approximated by a binary variable, taking
the value 1 or 0:
It is also interesting to examine rm characteristics. Table III shows statistics about the size of
the IPO. This is measured as the amount of proceedings from the IPO in million US dollars.
Table III - Size
all insider rst insider and no outsiders
Obs 3616 442 226
Mean 156.11 72.11 51.69
Median 64.4 45.49 40.68
Std. Dev 387.87 121.47 46.19
Skewness 6.32 7.97 3.55
These statistics show that companies recommended only from insiders, or whose rst recommen-
dation is issued by an insider, are smaller on average. It seems obvious that outsiders are more likely
to issue a recommendation about largerissues. This could constitute a problem if size is related to
rm unobservable quality. On the contrary as long as size is a measure of rm visibility13, it will be a
crucial factor in determining the incentives of outsiders to acquire information and issue a recommen-
dation. Size is also measured as number of shares issued. The two measures are quite correlated (the
coe¢ cient of correlation is 0.81) and similarly distributed.
Table IV in the appendix summarizes the industry each rm pertains to, as recorded in the Thom-
son One Banker dataset. The table reports the 25 industries observed more often. Most rms operate
in the IT sector (Software, IT Consulting & Services, Semiconductors, etc.) reecting the Hi - Tech
boom of the nineties. The dataset provides two distinct denitions for industry, at di¤erent levels of
aggregation. The most detailed of these14 is used in the regressions.
6 Results
I rstly test whether the predictions of the opportunistic view are consistent with the empirical be-
haviour of analysts. Then, I turn to discriminate between the opportunistic and the naive view.
13This expression refers to the degree investors are interested in getting information about the company.
14Similar to the SIC 3-digit classication, although not exactly coincident with the SIC classication system.
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6.1 Testing the Opportunistic View
The rst step consists in testing the behaviour of insiders. The dependent variable is discrete and
ordered. This suggests estimating a multinomial ordered Logit or Probit model. However, a linear
model is more exible as it allows an easier use of xed or random e¤ects estimation. Furthermore,
the explanatory variables are mostly dummies and this makes the linear probability model a good
approximation for the underlying model.
The fact that an insider faces less competition when issuing a recommendation should be inuenced
by the size of the issue, the time period, the specic situation of the rm, the industry, possibly the
quality of the IPO. Then, the main regression takes the following form:
recci;j;t = + 0duminsi;j;t + 1insalonei;j;t + Xj;t + "i;j;t
where recci;j;t is the recommendation about rm j from analyst i at time t; duminsi;j;t is a dummy
variable taking the value 1 when the recommendation from analyst i about rm j is issued by an
insider, insalonei;j;t is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the recommendation on rm j
is issued by an analyst i being an insider alone, thus facing less competition from outsiders, in
the relevant time window, and Xj;t is a matrix of controls including industry xed e¤ects, quarterly
dummies to capture the e¤ect of the business cycle, the size of the issue (measured as the proceeds
amount of the issue15, the name of the variable is Size), the number of IPO per year (the name of
the variable is Numipo), the S&P 500 equally weighted index on the day of the recommendation16
(the name of the variable is S&P 500 E.W.I.), and returns on the stock, as a control for the quality
of the rm. I used the three, the six and the one year return from the issue date. Results are not
a¤ected by the choice of this time span. The three month return could be more directly a¤ected by
recommendations, while the one year return probably incorporates the inuence of other events that
were not included in the analyst information set at the time of the recommendation and could be
very di¢ cult to forecast. Therefore, I present results including the six-months returns as a control
for quality17 (the name of the variable is Six Month Return). The set of controls X aims at capturing
the likelihood other analysts issue a recommendation and the factors that can a¤ect the degree of
optimism of the recommendation.
As mentioned above, a key issue is the criterion used to classify whether an insider faces less
competition from outsider. Three criteria are used: the variable insalone will be labelled first when
an insider is dened to face less competition if he is the rst to issue a recommendation about the
company, insstre if there is no recommendation about the company issued on the same date or in the
two preceding days, and nally, onlyins if the insider is the only analyst issuing a recommendation
15Results are analogous if the number of shares issued is used as a measure of size.
16Source: Datastream.
17Another possibility is to include returns relative to industry performances, value weighted returns, or returns relative
to the S&P 500. Results are robust to these alternative choices.
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about the stock in the whole 45 days after the IPO date.
The error term "i;j;t can take a two way component form, so that "i;j;t = i + i;j;t where i
represents an analyst time invariant component. The crucial assumption for identication is that
E(d; "i;j;t j X) = 0 where d = dumins; insalone; where insalone can be onlyins; first; insstre: It can
be especially important to control for analyst xed e¤ects as rms can be allocated to analysts as a
function of analyst characteristics. Another specication takes care of the fact that recommendations
are discrete ordered variables, and the model is estimated as an ordered logit or probit. In such cases
the model becomes
Pr(recci;j;t = k) = (0duminsi;j;t + 1insalonei;j;t + Xj;t + "i;j;t)
for the logit, and
Pr(recci;j;t = k) = (0duminsi;j;t + 1insalonei;j;t + Xj;t + "i;j;t)
for the probit, where k = 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 is the value of the recommendation. Finally, as recommendations
issued by insiders only take values of 1; 2 or 3 as summarized in Table II B, it is possible to construct
a binary variable taking the value 1 if the recommendations is the highest (recc = 1) and zero if the
analyst has been less optimistic (recc = 2 and recc = 3): The model then has the following form
Pr(recci;j;t = 1) = + 0duminsi;j;t + 1insalonei;j;t + Xj;t + "i;j;t
if the linear probability model is used,
Pr(recci;j;t = 1) = (0duminsi;j;t + 1dinslonei;j;t + Xj;t + "i;j;t)
Pr(recci;j;t = 1) = (0duminsi;j;t + 1insalonei;j;t + Xj;t + "i;j;t)
if, respectively, a logit or a probit specication is used. Finally, insalone = first; onlyins; insstre
depending on the denition used to identify an insider as being aloneand thus facing less competition
from outsiders.
The main hypothesis to be tested concerns the behaviour of analysts as a function of whether other
analysts are transmitting information about the same company in a given time window. Starting from
the linear model, one gets, E(recc j X; insider) =  + 0 + X and E(recc j X; insider alone) =
+0+1+X: The main hypothesis to be tested is 1 = 0 versus an alternative 1 6= 0: The model
would suggest furthermore that 1 < 0; so that insiders are more optimistic when there is little coverage
of the stock from outsiders. Then, when the ordered logit model is estimated one gets, Pr(recc = 1 j
X; insider alone) Pr(recc = 1 j X; insider) = 1: Hence if 1 6= 0; insiders would behave di¤erently
depending on whether there are other outsider analysts issuing a recommendation. Correspondingly,
Pr(recc = 5 j X; insider alone)   Pr(recc = 5 j X; insider) would be di¤erent from zero and its sign
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is the opposite of 1: For intermediate outcomes, in order to test whether Pr(recc = k j X; insider
alone)   Pr(recc = k j X; insider) (where k = 2; 3; 4) is positive, it is necessary to use the estimated
threshold values. However, for the purpose of this work, it matters most to investigate whether insiders
alone are more or less likely to issue the most optimistic recommendation. Finally, in the simple probit
or logit model, where the dependent variable is the probability of observing a recommendation equal
to 1; the hypothesis is 1 6= 0; to investigate whether Pr(recci;j;t = 1 j X; insalone = 1) Pr(recci;j;t =
1 j X; insalone = 0) 6= 0; and a further hypothesis would be that 1 > 0: Now, the sign of 1 is positive
because the dependent variable is the probability the recommendation is the most optimistic. Thus,
1 > 0 means that when the insider issues the recommendation alone there is a larger probability of
observing the most optimistic recommendation.
Table V in the appendix reports results for insalone = first (an insider is identied as facing
less competition if he is the rst to issue a recommendation). The model is estimated with OLS, as
an ordered logit, and with both analyst xed and random e¤ects18. The dummy is signicant at the
10% level (p-value 0.07) when the model is estimated through OLS and maximum likelihood as an
ordered logit. When analyst xed e¤ects are included, the dummy is still signicant at the 10% level,
even if there is an average of about 2 recommendations per analyst. When the model is estimated
with random e¤ects, the dummy for the insider alone is signicant at the 5% level. Of course this
estimate could be inconsistent if E(i; X) 6= 0; i.e. if the analyst xed e¤ect is correlated with the
insider dummy, but an Hausman test does not reject the hypothesis that the random e¤ect provides
consistent estimates for the dummies for the insider facing less competition19. The dummy for being
an insider is signicant (at the 1% level) only when analyst e¤ects are taken into account. Moreover,
the estimate of the coe¢ cient for size is never signicant, although it changes sign, becoming negative,
when analyst xed e¤ects are included in which case it approaches the 10% signicance level. It is also
interesting to notice that the number of IPO in the year has a negative sign and it is signicant when
analysts xed e¤ects are included. Therefore, when the market is "hotter", controlling for analyst
xed e¤ects, recommendations tend to be more optimistic. The S&P 500 is positive and signicant
at the 10% level, except when analyst xed e¤ects are included. The positive sign seems to indicate
that when the market raise, recommendations tend to be less optimistic. It is not easy to rationalize
this fact. The six month return has the expected sign (negative, indicating that larger returns are
associated with smaller, and thus more optimistic, recommendations) but it is not signicant. This
might be caused by the fact that returns at a relatively short horizon are a poor measure of the
information received by analysts when issuing recommendations on IPOs20.
18Standard errors are estimated allowing for clustering at the analyst level except in the xed and random e¤ect cases.
In the latter cases standard errors are consistently estimated provided the analyst e¤ects are not time varying.
19Another point to be mentioned is that the panel is unbalanced. An analyst might disappear from the dataset both
because he is red, because is promoted or because resigns. I dont have such information. However it is not clear that
the process determining whether an analyst is still in the sample is correlated to his degree of optimism as a function of
the degree of competition from outsiders.
20Using returns over longer horizons would add noise, as new information become available.
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Table VI reports the same analysis for the case insalone = insstre (the analyst is identied as
facing less competition if there were no recommendations from outsiders or other insiders in the 2
days before). The coe¢ cient for the dummy for the insider facing less competition is negative and
signicant at the 10% level for the OLS estimation and at the 5% when the model is specied as an
ordered logit. When analyst xed e¤ects are introduced the dummy is negative but not signicant,
while when the model is estimated with random e¤ects the dummy is negative and signicant at the
10% level. Again when analyst e¤ects are included the dummy for being an insider becomes signicant.
The other coe¢ cients behave in the same way as in the set of regressions presented in Table V for the
case insalone = first:
Table VII reports results for the last denition used to identify an insider as issuing a recommen-
dation facing less competition: the case insalone = onlyins (the insider is the only analyst to issue a
recommendation on the stock). This is probably the most restrictive denition and opens the possibil-
ity that sample selection has the strongest inuence. On the other hand this denition allows to better
capture the situation when the insider analyst feels less competitive pressure (I am assuming she has
rational expectations) and thus would, according to the model predictions, behave opportunistically.
Results are stronger, as the dummy for insider alone is negative and signicant at the 1% level when
the model is estimated with OLS, or specied as an ordered logit. It is signicant at the 5% level when
estimated with analyst random e¤ects and at the 10% level when analyst xed e¤ects are included.
The other parameters show a behaviour analogous to the previous cases. Six month returns on the
stock are negative as expected, but still not signicant.
Finally, Table VIII reports the results of the regressions run considering recommendations as a
binary variable, with 1 indicating that the most optimistic recommendation has been issued; for the
case the insider faces less competition when is the rst to issue a recommendation. Results for the
other denitions are very similar. Again, the coe¢ cient for the insider facing less competition has
the expected sign (now positive as the dependent variable is now the probability of observing the
most optimistic recommendation. Therefore a positive coe¢ cient now indicates a more optimistic
behaviour).The coe¢ cient is signicant at the 1% level when the model is estimated through random
e¤ects, and at the 5% level in all the other cases. The coe¢ cient for size is not signicant for all
models. The same happens for the number of IPOs in the year. The coe¢ cient on the six month
return on the stock has the expected sign (now positive, indicating that a larger return is associated
with a greater chances of observing the most optimistic recommendation), but it is not signicant.
Table IX reports results from logit regressions with analyst xed e¤ects to take care of the po-
tential e¤ect of analyst unobserved heterogeneity in a properly specied binary choice model. Some
observations are lost, as there are very few observations for some analysts that are all 0 or 1 and thus
dropped by the estimation package. This reduces the sample size. However, the dummy for insider
alone is signicant at the 5 % level when the insider is considered as facing less competition if he is the
rst to issue a recommendation, or if no recommendations from outsiders are observed in the previous
three days, although in the latter case it is signicant at the 10 % level. On the contrary, it is not
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signicant for onlyins(the coe¢ cient has the predicted sign, however).
These results suggest that the number of outsiders, an explicit measure of coverage of the stock,
should inuence the behaviour of insiders. Including the number of outsiders who issued a recommen-
dation in the 45 days time span in a regression might entail problems of endogeneity, as the number of
outsiders might be larger if the quality of the company is better (but then, the bias should go in the
opposite direction: insiders should observe better signals when in fact more outsiders issue a recom-
mendation). If the insider has rational expectations, he will be able to forecast correctly the number of
outsiders issuing a recommendation on the same company, and thus the degree of competition. Results
suggest that, indeed, the degree of optimism of the insider falls, as the number of outsiders issuing
a recommendation on the company grows. Table X shows the result of a regression for recommen-
dations issued by insiders on the number of outsiders who issued a recommendation on the company
plus the usual control. The number of outsiders has a positive and signicant coe¢ cient, indicating
that the larger the number of outsiders, the higher, and thus the less optimistic, the recommendation.
It is interesting to notice that now the coe¢ cient for size is negative and signicant, suggesting that
insiders are more optimistic on larger rms, once controlling for the total number of outsiders. This is
interesting as it seems to indicate that size embeds a larger chance outsiders issue a recommendation.
Once this e¤ect is netted out, size turns out to be signicant and negative, indicating that larger com-
panies are more likely to receive positive recommendations by insiders. Table XI presents results of
a probit regression for the probability the insider issues the most optimistic recommendation. Again,
the number of analysts reduces the chances the insider is very optimistic (remember that a positive
sign here points to a higher probability the insider issues a recommendation equal to 1). The other
variables behave in the same way as in the linear regression presented in Table X.
Thus, this analysis suggests that insider analysts are less optimistic when the competitive pressure
from outsider analysts is stronger.
6.2 Discriminating between the Opportunistic and the Naive View: Testing for
Bayesian Updating
The results presented up to this point could have also been caused by simple rational Bayesian
updating or even by herd behaviour: when insiders are the rst to issue a recommendation they do
not have any other information but their private signals, while if they can observe a report from an
outsider, they might decide to use this information when issuing a recommendation on the company.
Thus, it is important to understand whether Bayesian updating takes place, in order to distinguish the
opportunisticversus the naiveview to explain overoptimism. To this end, I will examine whether
insiders are inuenced by outsiders when issuing their recommendation. This is done by checking
whether the chances the insider issues a positive recommendation increase after observing a positive
recommendation from outsiders. In practice, I will both consider the average recommendation from
outsiders, and the best recommendation. The average recommendation from outsiders issued before
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the insider is distributed as follows
recc obs freq cum recc obs freq cum
1 87 33.72 33.72 2.333 1 0.39 93.41
1.333 2 0.78 34.50 2.5 7 2.71 96.12
1.5 38 14.73 49.22 2.666 1 0.39 96.51
1.666 5 1.94 51.16 3 9 3.49 100.00
2 108 41.86 93.02
Total 258
where obs indicates the actual number of occurrences, freq the probability frequency, and cum the
cumulative probability. It can be seen that half of the times the average recommendation is not below
1:5: Therefore I dene a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the average recommendation is greater
or equal than 1:5: This captures the cases where recommendations equal to 1 are not less than those
larger than 1: The second regression uses the most optimistic recommendation issued by outsiders,
and I dene a dummy variable taking the value 1 when at least an outsider issued a 1. This strategy
is formalized as follows
pr(reccins;i;t = 1) = (+ outopti + Xi;t + "i;t)
where reccins;i;t represents the recommendation issued by the insider on company i at time t, outopti
is a dummy taking the value 1 if either the average of outsider recommendations is larger than 1.5,
or whether at least one outsider issued a 1 (the highest possible), and Xi;t is a vector of controls
including size, number of IPOs in the year, quarterly and industry dummies, the six month return
on the stock, and the S&P equally weighted index. The main hypothesis to be tested is whether
 6= 0; and in particular whether  > 0: Table XII-A presents results for the sample including only
recommendations issued in the three days prior to the date the insider issued his recommendation. As
the sample is not very large, quarterly and industry dummies are excluded from the estimation. Results
show clearly that outopt; the measure for outsider optimism, is not signicant. Table XII-B presents
results including all recommendations issued before the one issued by the insider. Of course there can
be noise in these results, as new information about the company becomes available. Again there is no
evidence the insider is more likely to issue the most optimistic recommendation following optimistic
reports from outsiders. Similar results can be obtained if the regression includes all recommendations
issued in the 10 or 5 days prior to the recommendation issued by the insider. Notice that nding
a signicant coe¢ cient of the dummy for an optimistic report from outsiders would not signal that
insiders use the information of outsiders, it could just be that the company is of intrinsically good
quality. However, nding the coe¢ cient is not signicant is clearly inconsistent with the hypothesis
that insiders update their information observing the information provided by outsiders.
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The same analysis is performed to investigate the behaviour of outsiders. The probit regression
pr(reccout;i;t = 1) = (+ insopti + Xi;t + "i;t)
is run on the sample of recommendations issued by outsiders in the days after the insider recom-
mendations. In the regression insopt is a dummy taking the value 1 if the insider issued the most
optimistic recommendation. Results are reported in Table XIII and clearly indicate that the dummy is
not signicant: outsiders do not seem to use the information contained in insiders recommendations
to update their beliefs about the company. This is interesting as insiders are likely to hold more
precise information about the company. This result seems to suggest that outsiders do not regard the
information provided by insiders as very credible21.
6.3 Summary of Results
The evidence provided so far suggests the following:
1. Insiders issue more optimistic recommendations when competition, measured in various ways
referring to the extent of coverage from outsider analysts, is less intense.
2. Insiders do not seem to update their beliefs when observing outsiders recommendations, as the
probability they issue the highest possible recommendation is not a¤ected by whether they
observed a positive recommendation by outsiders.
3. Outsiders do not use the informational content of insiders recommendations as they are not
more optimistic after observing an optimistic recommendation from the insider.
These ndings help to distinguish between competing hypotheses brought forward to explain in-
sider analysts overoptimism. The rst nding would be consistent both with an incentive based theory,
and with an irrationality based theory where insiders are optimistically biased but update their in-
formation rationally, so that they learn about the true distribution of rm quality when observing
recommendations from outsiders. The second nding would be consistent with an incentive based
theory, but not with the irrationality with learninghypothesis. In the latter case, insiders should
be more optimistic when observing an optimistic message and less optimistic otherwise. On the con-
trary, the fact that they tend to maintain the same degree of optimism independently of whether they
observed positive recommendations from outsiders, suggests insiders behave opportunistically aiming
at sustaining a positive perception of the quality of the IPO. The third nding, that outsiders do not
seem to be inuenced by an optimistic recommendation from the insider, signals that recommendations
from insiders are not regarded as credible by outsiders.
21Of course there can be other explanations, such as the fact that outsiders want to impress the market through an
anti-herding strategy.
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Thus far the analysis maintained the assumption that the degree of competition from outsiders,
i.e. independent of intrinsic rm quality, once observable characteristics of the IPO are controlled for.
The analysis also controlled for the inuence of analyst xed e¤ects, and this seems to be su¢ cient
to conclude that the dummy for the insider alone is exogenous conditional on rm characteristics
and analyst identity. However, the next section explicitly addresses the possibility that some form
of selection takes place, so that the degree of competition (stock coverage from outsider analysts) is
lower exactly when the IPO is of better quality.
7 Addressing Selection
One potential problem of the analysis is the possible presence of selection bias: if it happens that insider
analysts face less competition exactly when rms are better, then there would be no strategic behaviour
from insiders who would just be reporting what they observe. There can be three answers to this
important point. The rst is that it would be hard to imagine that outsiders issue recommendations
about worse rms: if they have more freedom about which rm to analyse, then it would be unlikely
that they on average chose to cover the less promising rms. The second answer is that controlling
for the number of IPOs in the year, industry and quarterly dummies, the six month return on the
stock which is a proxy for quality, the size of the issue and analyst xed e¤ects, should be enough to
control for the e¤ect of selection. The third answer is to run regressions that can address the selection
problem. I will rstly use an Heckman selection model, and then Instrumental Variables with the
predicted probability the insider faces less competition (the insider is alone) as an instrument. Both
models use an exclusion restriction on the variable size of the IPO. This variable typically used a
control in regressions where the dependent variable is earnings forecast, or rm returns. I included
it in the base model as a further control as I do not have access to many rm level characteristics.
However, it is not theoretically clear why the size of the IPO should be included as an explanatory
variable in a regression where the dependent variable is a recommendation which should represent a
signal of rm quality. In other words, it is not obvious why the IPO size should a¤ect its quality. This
is especially true as I included a proxy for rm quality such as realized returns on the stock. The
fact that size is not signicant in the base regressions provides some support to this hypothesis. On
the other hand, size is clearly a measure of rm visibility, and therefore of the likelihood outsiders
will compete with the insider in providing information about the company. Thus, for these reasons,
it seems that size can be part of a valid exclusion restriction and used to construct an instrument for
the probability the insider faces less competition from outsiders.
A rst regression models the probability the insider faces less competition using an Heckman
selection model. The probability the insider issues a recommendation alone is modelled as follows
Pr(Insalonei;j;t = 1) = (sizej ; Xj;t;  i;j;t)
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where  i;j;t is a disturbance term, while the equation for the recommendation is as before
recci;j;t = + 0duminsj + 1insalonej;t + Xj;t + "i;j;t
where estimates of the latter equation would be inconsistent if corr( i;j;t; "i;j;t) 6= 0: The matrix of
controls is analogous to that in the base model, I estimate the model using a two-step procedure, as
this is more robust, although it would not be e¢ cient if the two disturbances  i;j;t and "i;j;t were jointly
Normal. One exclusion restriction is imposed as size is used as explanatory variable for the probability
the insider is alone, but it is excluded by the equation to explain the recommendation. Table XIV
shows results. The dummy for the insider facing less competition is negative but not signicant
(p   value at 0:14) when insalone = first. However, the disturbances seem not to be correlated, as
the covariance lambda is not signicantly di¤erent from zero: therefore the hypothesis that there is
no selection cannot be rejected. The same happens when insalone = onlyins : the dummy for insider
alone is not signicant but the correlation between the disturbances is not signicantly di¤erent from
zero. When instead insalone = insstre; the coe¢ cient is negative and signicant at the 5% level.
However, the covariance of the errors is again not signicantly di¤erent from zero and the hypothesis
that selection is not an issue cannot be rejected. Therefore, it might appear that the evidence that
outsider analyst coverage induces a less optimistic behaviour on part of insider analysts is weakened
by these results: the coe¢ cient on the dummy for the insider facing less competition is signicant
only for one of the three denitions. However, there is little evidence for selection e¤ect to matter
once controls for returns and market conditions are included and there would be no need to run the
Heckman selection model as the results presented in Tables 5 to 9 would provide consistent estimates
of the parameters (at least the specication with analysts xed e¤ects).
Another approach consists in using instrumental variables. The positive side of this approach is that
it poses less structure than the Heckman model. The instrument used is the predicted probability the
insider is alone. This requires nding an appropriate exclusion restriction to estimate the model. As
discussed above, size has no clear theoretical link with rm unobservable quality, while it is likely to be
correlated with the degree of competition the insider faces on a given stock. The identication strategy
thus uses the predicted probability the insider faces less competition as an instrument. Operationally,
the rst step consists in running a regression for Pr(insalonei;j;t = 1) = (+ Xj;t + zj); where zj
is the size of rm j. Then the predicted probabilities \Pr(insalone = 1) are used as instruments for
insalone in a 2 Stage Least Square regression, where the second stage is recci;j;t = + 0duminsj +
1Zj;t + Xj;t + "i;j;t and Zj;t is the rst stage regression predicted insalone from the regression
insalonei;j;t = +  \Pr(insalonei;j;t = 1)+ Xj;t+ i;j;t: Wooldridge (2002) shows that this procedure
allows to consistently estimate 1: An important assumption for this approach to be valid is that
E(recc) is linear in the regressors. As recc is a discrete variable that will not hold in this case.
However the linear probability model is a good approximation in this case and so this approach is not
that bad in this situation. A nice feature of this identication strategy is that it is robust to mis-
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specication of the model for Pr(first = 1): In fact, even if that is not a probit function, the estimates
from the rst step will be consistent, as argued in Wooldridge (2002). Results are summarized in
Table XV: the dummy for insider facing less competition is negative and signicant for both the case
of insalone = first and the case insalone = onlyins: It is negative and barely signicant for the
case insalone = insstre as the p   value on the coe¢ cient is 0:106. On the contrary the behaviour
of the dummy for insiders changes: the sign of the coe¢ cient is now positive, indicating that insiders
are more optimistic than the baseline situation (average outsider recommendation) when they are not
alone. However it is never signicantly di¤erent from zero. The number of IPOs per year is negative
and signicant, suggesting that the larger the number of IPOs, the more recommendations are positive.
This can be caused by many e¤ects: it could be that best rms tend to wait periods of boomto go
public, or it could be that analysts tend to be more optimistic in periods when the market is hotas
they know it is likely that all stocks will grow for a while and thus they can inate more safely their
recommendations.
8 Discussion
The evidence provided suggests that insider analysts behave di¤erently according to whether there
are other analysts providing information about a rm. This could be due to opportunistic behaviour,
to Bayesian updating, or to sample selection. The latter can be excluded in light of the evidence
provided by the selection and the I.V. regressions and by the set of controls included in the standard
regressions. Thus it does not seem that insider analysts issue a recommendation facing less competition
when companies are of higher quality. Bayesian updating is inconsistent with the evidence provided
in section 5.3. Then opportunistic behaviour remains as the only explanation consistent with the
empirical evidence.
An important implication of these results is that the psychologicalexplanation for insider overop-
timism is inconsistent with the evidence documented in this paper. On the contrary, the empirical
evidence is consistent with the opportunistic view for analyst overoptimism. This conclusion has
important policy implications: if insiders overoptimism was caused by a psychological bias, changing
insiders incentives might have a limited e¤ect on the information they provide. On the contrary, if
their behaviour is driven by existing incentives, then that should be the focus of policy makers.
It is useful to discuss further the possible role of selection by thinking about what the results are
suggesting. If insiders are more optimistic when no outsiders are issuing a recommendation because
the rm is intrinsically better when they face less competition, then outsiders analysts tend to con-
centrate on rms that have worse perspectives ex-ante. This conclusion is di¢ cult to defend: nancial
information can be thought of as an experience good. An investor appreciates the quality of an analyst
recommendation if she invests in the company recommended. She would not do so if the recommen-
dation is not very positive. It is di¢ cult to think that investors follow a stock they did not purchase
in order to evaluate whether the negative recommendation of the analyst was right. Thus, if anything,
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outsiders should, on average, cover a company with better ex-ante prospects. Then the fact the insider
faces less competition would be negatively correlated with the quality of the company. In such a case
the results of this paper would even more strongly suggest that insiders behave opportunistically and
that competition has a benecial role in disciplining insider analysts.
A last point concerns the decision to issue a recommendation: this has not been modelled formally,
and it was assumed that insiders always issue a recommendation. However, this is not necessarily the
case. It is not clear what the incentives of the insider are in such a situation: she might prefer to
say nothing rather than issue a bad recommendation. Then, the market should discount this fact and
interpret no recommendation as a bad recommendation, thus reducing the incentives to keep silent.
Under an empirical point of view, this means there is no recommendation by insiders about the worst
company. This can justify why insider recommendations are, on average, more optimistic than those of
outsiders, but has no e¤ect on the di¤erential behaviour of insiders as a function of whether outsiders
issue a recommendation. A possibility would be that insiders decide not to issue a recommendation
because they know there will be an outsider around and the cost of lying, in terms of reputation, will
be larger. In such a case, we would observe insiders issuing a recommendation when outsiders are
likely to be around, for better companies, and the larger degree of optimism of insiders when they face
less competition, would even be underestimated.
9 Conclusion
This paper develops a theoretical model to investigate whether the presence of less informed but
unbiased agents can reduce opportunistic behaviour of more informed, but possibly biased agents
(insiders). The theoretical model predicts that insiders should report information less optimistically
when other unbiased, but less informed, agents issue a recommendation as well. This result is brought
to data and tested on nancial analysts recommendations on IPOs issued during the rst 45 days
from the date of the IPO. The main result is that analysts working for the bookrunner (insiders)
tend to be more optimistic when there is less coverage of the stock from outsider analysts. The
paper employs three measures to identify when the insider is monopolistas coverage from outsiders
is weaker: if she is the rst analyst to issue a recommendation about the IPO, if no other analyst
issued a recommendation on the same day and in the two previous days, if no other analyst issued a
recommendation at all on the same company in the 45 days window. The empirical analysis shows that
for all denitions, an insider facing less competition issues more optimistic recommendations. These
results could not necessarily be driven by incentives, but might be generated by two factors. The rst is
rational Bayesian updating: insiders are optimistically biased but update their information if they can
observe recommendations from outsiders. However regression analysis does not reject the hypothesis
that the degree of overoptimism is independent of whether the insider observed information from
outsiders, providing evidence against Bayesian updating. The second is selection: an insider could be
facing less competition exactly when the rm is of better quality, so that the overoptimism is in fact just
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a truthful report about rms coming from a higher quality sample. Even though this seems unlikely
to happen in practice, such concern can be addressed by estimating the model include appropriate
controls, by estimating an Heckman model, and by using an instrumental variable framework. Results
seem to be robust to these further checks.
Moreover the results of this paper allow to discriminate between the two major hypotheses the
literature proposed to explain insider analysts overoptimism: the rst, which I label the opportunistic
viewsuggests that insiders are inuenced by incentives, the second, the naive view, suggests that
analysts are a¤ected by a cognitive bias that make them truly convinced about the superior quality of
the rm they followed through the whole due diligence process. They might be less optimistic if they
update their biased beliefs after observing the unbiased signals of outsiders. The fact that insiders
are not more likely to issue a positive recommendation when they observe a positive recommendation
from outsiders is inconsistent with this hypothesis. Hence, these results provide indirect evidence in
favour of the hypothesis that insider analyst overoptimism is driven by incentives. The fact that
insider analyst behaviour is shaped by incentives rather than by a psychological bias, is not only an
academic result, but leads to important policy implications: if the naive view was correct, it would
be advisable to appoint an analyst as responsible for the due diligence process, and a di¤erent one as
responsible for providing information to the market after the IPO. That would create a duplication
of e¤ort but improve the quality of information. Measures aiming at reducing the extent to which
analyst pay is linked to overall (and thus investment banking) performance will be useless. On the
contrary, the opposite would be true if analysts are overoptimistic because of incentives as suggested
by the results presented in this paper.
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10 Appendix - Tables
Table IV - Distribution of rms by industry. Total number of rms: 1718
Industry Number of obs: Frequency
Software 319 18:57
IT Consulting&Services 140 8:15
Professional Services 119 6:93
Healthcare Equipment&Supplies 111 6:46
Semiconductors 73 4:25
Computers&Peripherals 64 3:73
Telecommunications Equipment 53 3:08
Pharmaceuticals 48 2:79
Internet Software & Services 46 2:68
Healthcare Providers & Services(HMOs) 41 2:39
Biotechnology 40 2:33
Telecommunications Services 40 2:33
Machinery 29 1:69
Oil&Gas 29 1:69
Electronics 28 1:63
Other Consumer Products 28 1:63
REITs 23 1:34
Food & Beverage Retailing 22 1:28
Insurance 22 1:28
Other Retailing 21 1:22
Other Financials 20 1:16
Advertising & Marketing 19 1:11
Building/Construction & Engineering 18 1:05
Chemicals 17 0:99
Food & Beverages 17 0:99
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Table V
Dependent variable is recommendation coded from 1 (most optimistic), to 5 (less optimistic).
Regression with robust standard errors Number of obs = 3614
Number of clusters (analyst) = 1361
OLS Ordered Logit F ixedEffects RandomEffects
First
 :0603493
( 1:75)
 :2351518
( 1:80)
 :0589403
( 1:75)
 :0576215
( 1:95)
Dumins
 :0175948
( 0:64)
 :0498783
( 0:49)
 :1152867
( 4:78)
 :078634
( 3:79)
Numipo
 :0000256
( 0:78)
 :0000923
( 0:76)
 :0000574
( 1:76)
 :0000312
( 1:10)
Size
:0000287
(0:91)
:0001087
(0:91)
 :0000553
( 1:60)
0:00000268
(0:10)
Six Month Return
 :0097875
( 0:70)
 :0369763
( 0:71)
 :0190627
( 1:56)
 :0160713
( 1:42)
S&P 500 (E.W.I.)
:0005639
(1:78)
:001972
(1:68)
:0004495
(1:50)
:0005238
(1:96)
Quarterly dummies yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
Analyst xed e¤ects no no yes no
R-. Squared 0:0878 0:0559 0:0227 0:0766
Note : t  statistics in parenthesis:
* signicant at 10%, ** signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
Hausman test for coe¢ cient on first chi2= :0013188:0163333
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Table VI
Dependent variable is recommendation coded from 1 (most optimistic), to 5 (less optimistic).
Number of obs = 3614
Regression with robust standard errors
Number of clusters (analyst) = 1361
OLS Ordered Logit F ixedEffects RandomEffects
Insstre
 :061897
( 1:93)
 :2457085
( 2:03)
 :043044
( 1:35)
 :0459819
( 1:63)
Dumins
 :009928
( 0:34)
 :0179791
( 0:17)
 :1160697
( 4:54)
 :0775404
( 3:49)
Numipo
 :0000247
( 0:75)
 :0000881
( 0:73)
 :0000567
( 1:74)
 :0000304
( 1:07)
Size
:0000291
(0:92)
:0001094
(0:91)
 :0000547
( 1:58)
0:00000329
(0:12)
Six Month Return
 :010271
( 0:74)
 :0385424
( 0:74)
 :0195319
( 1:59)
 :0165101
( 1:46)
S&P 500 (E.W.I.)
:00056
(1:77)
:0019566
(1:67)
:0004465
(1:49)
:0005215
(1:95)
Quarterly dummies yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
Analyst xed e¤ects no no yes no
R Squared 0:0880 0:0560 0:0226 0:0766
Note : t  statistics in parenthesis:
* signicant at 10%, ** signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
Hausman test for insstre parameter = :0029379:0148287
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Table VII
Dependent variable is recommendation coded from 1 (most optimistic), to 5 (less optimistic).
Regression with robust standard errors
Number of clusters (analyst) = 1361
Number of obs = 3614
OLS Ordered Logit F ixedEffects RandomEffects
Onlyins
 :1382504
( 3:39)
 :548603
( 3:25)
 :0767929
( 1:76)
 :0940997
( 2:53)
Dumins
 :0153119
( 0:60)
 :0418544
( 0:44)
 :122648
( 5:48)
 :0824697
( 4:32)
Numipo
 :0000257
( 0:79)
 :0000927
( 0:76)
 :0000564
( 1:73)
 :0000306
( 1:08)
Size
:0000261
(0:83)
:0000991
(0:82)
 :0000549
( 1:59)
0:00000196
(0:07)
Six Month Return
 :0106935
( 0:77)
 :0402189
( 0:77)
 :019381
( 1:58)
 :0165915
( 1:47)
S&P 500 (E.W.I.)
:0005684
(1:80)
:0019893
(1:70)
:0004472
(1:49)
:0005279
(1:98)
Quarterly dummies yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
Analyst xed e¤ects no no yes no
R Squared 0:0898 0:0573 0:0233 0:0784
Note : t  statistics in parenthesis:
* signicant at 10%, ** signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
Hausman test on parameter for onlyins= :0173068:0226552
39
Table VIII dep-variable: is probability recommendation is the highest.
Number of observations:3614 for OLS, Fixed and Random E¤ects; 3602 for Probit.
Number of Clusters: 1361
OLS Pr obit F ixedEffects RandomEffects
First
:0573772
(1:87)
:1597304
(1:95)
:0581979
(2:03)
:0555618
(2:20)
Dumins
:0047433
(0:19)
:0103156
(0:16)
:0891007
(4:36)
:061415
(3:46)
Numipo
:0000248
(0:87)
:0000657
(0:88)
:0000369
(1:34)
:0000248
(1:02)
Size
0:00000521
(0:21)
:0000143
(0:21)
:0000416
(1:42)
:0000194
(0:84)
Six Month Return
:0079841
(0:62)
:0214242
(0:63)
:0166091
(1:60)
:013844
(1:44)
S&P 500 (E.W.I.)
 :0004563
( 1:60)
 :0012317
( 1:64)
 :0003174
( 1:25)
 :0003931
( 1:73)
Quarterly dummies yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
Analyst xed e¤ects no no yes no
R Squared 0:0827 0:0601 0:0245 0:0694
Note: t  statistics in parenthesis: * signicant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
Hausman test for coe¢ cient on rst= :0026361:0134663
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Table IX - Logit estimation with analyst xed e¤ects.
Dep variable probability recommendation is highest.
Conditional xed-e¤ects logistic regression Number of obs = 1541
Group variable (i): analyst, Number of groups = 307
Obs per group: min = 2; avg = 5.0; max = 32
1054 groups (2073 obs) dropped due to all positive or
all negative outcomes.
primo insstre onlyins
Insalone
:5415884
(2:04)
:464767
(1:85)
:334733
(0:95)
Dumins
:8094513
(4:22)
:795299
(3:96)
:9352079
(5:15)
Numipo
:0003488
(1:25)
:0003356
(1:20)
:0003581
(1:28)
Size
:0004643
(1:88)
:0004511
(1:83)
:0004543
(1:85)
Six Month Return
:16969
(1:90)
:1719743
(1:93)
:167388
(1:88)
S&P 500 (E.W.I.)
 :0011533
( 0:53)
 :001162
( 0:53)
 :0013269
( 0:61)
Quarterly dummies yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes
Analyst xed e¤ects yes yes yes
Note: z   statistics in parenthesis: * signicant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
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Regressions including the number of outsiders issuing a recommendation as a control
Table X
Dependent variable is recommendation coded from 1 (most optimistic), to 5 (less optimistic).
Number of obs = 1236. R-squared = 0.1633. Number of clusters (analyst) = 658
(standard errors adjusted for clustering on analyst)
recc
Number of outsiders
:0379669
(1:91)
size
 :0001759
( 1:94)
numipo
 :0000592
( 1:15)
Six Month Return
 :0162068
( 0:64)
S&P 500 (E.W.I.)
:0016213
(2:92)
quarterly dummies yes
industry dummies yes
Note: t  statistics in parenthesis, *: signicant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
Table XI
Dep variable probability recommendation is highest. Probit estimates.
Number of obs = 1213. Pseudo R2 = 0.1199
(standard errors adjusted for clustering on analyst)
Pr(recc = 1)
Number of outsiders
 :0969941
( 1:98)
Size
:0004352
(1:77)
Numipo
:0002201
(1:68)
Six Month Return
:0399261
(0:64)
S&P 500 (E.W.I.)
 :0046967
( 3:57)
quarterly dummies yes
industry dummies yes
Note: t  statistics in parenthesis, *: signicant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
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Table XII-A - recommendation issued in the 3 days before the insider recommendation
Dep variable probability recommendation is highest. Only recommendations from insiders.
Probit estimates Number of obs = 125
(standard errors adjusted for clustering on analyst)
Pr(recc = 1) Pr(recc = 1)
Outopt(avg  1:5) :2755364
(1:15)
Outopt(best = 1)
:2512684
(1:05)
Size
:0004227
(1:08)
:0004216
(1:08)
Numipo
:000161
(1:27)
:000158
(1:25)
Six Month Return
:2282707
(1:54)
:2305434
(1:55)
S&P 500 (E.W.I.)
 :0027933
( 1:48)
 :0027537
( 1:46)
Note: z   statistics in parenthesis, *: signicant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
TableXII-B All recommendation issued before the insider recommendation.
Dep variable probability recommendation is highest. Only recommendations from insiders.
Probit estimates Number of obs = 257
Pr(recc = 1) Pr(recc = 1)
Outopt(avg  1:5) :1894889
(1:18)
Outopt(best = 1)
:1737748
(1:07)
Size
:0005006
(1:67)
:0005001
(1:67)
Numipo
:0000777
(0:87)
:0000765
(0:86)
Six Month Return
 :0376419
( 0:32)
 :0356409
( 0:30)
S&P 500 (E.W.I.)
 :0016543
( 1:25)
 :0016447
( 1:25)
Note: z   statistics in parenthesis, *: signicant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
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Table XIII - Probability an outsider issues the best recommendation.
Dep variable probability recommendation is highest. Only recommendations from outsiders.
Probit estimates Number of obs = 560
(standard errors adjusted for clustering on analyst)
Pr ob(Out = 1)
Insopt(recc = 1)
 :0856648
( 0:63)
Size
 :0000118
( 0:08)
Numipo
 :0001188
( 1:95)
Six Month Return
 :0263024
( 0:37)
S&P 500 (E.W.I.)
:000961
(1:06)
Note: z   statistics in parenthesis, *: signicant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
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Table XIV Heckman selection regression for the dummy insider faces less competition
Dependent variable is recommendation coded from 1 (most optimistic), to 5 (less optimistic).
Treatreg - Two Step
Number of Observations: 3788
Exclusion restriction on Size
first insstre onlyins
Insalone
 :2415127
( 1:46)
 :3285428
( 1:98)
 :2160974
( 1:45)
Dumins
 :0179517
( 0:80)
 :0097475
( 0:40)
 :0159332
( 0:78)
Numipo
 :0000281
( 0:87)
 :0000236
( 0:72)
 :0000276
( 0:86)
Six Month Return
 :0086122
( 0:65)
 :0108783
( 0:81)
 :0106999
( 0:81)
S&P 500 (E.W.I.)
:0005743
(1:86)
:0005596
(1:79)
:0005747
(1:87)
Quarterly dummies yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes
Covariance of
unobservables
:0994642
(1:11)
:1510167
(1:63)
:0415404
(0:53)
First Stage
Size
 :0016533
( 5:30)
 :0013702
( 5:24)
 :0073185
( 6:53)
Numipo
:000000984
( 0:01)
:0000751
(0:74)
:0000186
(0:14)
Six Month Return
:0301355
(0:70)
 :0157219
( 0:38)
 :070882
( 1:04)
S&P 500 (E.W.I.)
:0002399
(0:23)
 :0001515
( 0:16)
:0010675
(0:71)
Quarterly dummies yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes
Note: t  statistics in parenthesis, * signicant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
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Table XV Instrumental Variables regression.
Dependent variable is recommendation coded from 1 (most optimistic), to 5 (less optimistic).
First: IV (2SLS) regression with robust standard errors
Number of obs = 3413 Number of clusters (analyst) = 1276 R Squared = 0.0247
Insstre: IV (2SLS) regression with robust standard errors
Number of obs = 3487 Number of clusters (analyst) = 1305 R Squared =.
onlyins: IV (2SLS) regression with robust standard errors
Number of obs = 3200 Number of clusters (analysts) = 1191 R Squared = 0.0652
first insstre onlyins
Insalone
 :5701914
( 1:76)
 :6961021
( 1:62)
 :5205499
( 2:39)
Dumins
:1678006
(1:43)
:288949
(1:43)
:070183
(1:51)
Numipo
 :0000789
( 2:17)
 :0000664
( 1:71)
 :000092
( 2:50)
Six Month Return
:0000565
(0:00)
 :0072089
( 0:48)
 :0041657
( 0:29)
S&P 500 (E.W.I.)
:0006208
(1:83)
:0005925
(1:76)
:0006075
(1:81)
Quarterly dummies yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes
F irst Stage
Size
 :0016533
( 5:30)
 :0013702
( 5:24)
 :0073185
( 6:53)
Numipo
-0.000000984
( 0:01)
.0000751
(0:74)
.0000186
(0:14)
Six Month Return
.0301355
(0:70)
-.0157219
( 0:38)
-.070882
( 1:04)
S&P 500 (E.W.I.)
.0002399
(0:23)
-.0001515
( 0:16)
 :0013702
( 5:24)
Quarterly dummies yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes
Note: t  statistics in parenthesis: * signicant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
2SLS: Get predicted probability of insalone: Then use the predicted probability from rst stage
as IV for insalone in a 2SLS regression.
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